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ARTICLES
NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY OR
INTELLECTUAL ARROGANCE? THE CURRENT
ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN COURTS TOWARDS
FOREIGN LAW
SIR BASIL MARKESINIS*
I. THE OPEN SOCIETY
DURING the 19th century American law (as, indeed, English law)
was open to foreign inﬂuences. Foreign creativity was welcomed,
not seen as an attempt to interfere with American values and life
by telling them how to ordain their aﬀairs. English statutes, mainly
on matters of private law, would thus reach the westward
expanding United States with a jet lag of anything between 10 and
20 years.1 Decisions of the highest English courts would also be
followed, within about the same period of time, unless local
conditions made their adoption undesirable.2 Occasionally and
increasingly local courts also developed the courage to challenge the
wisdom of the progenitor system, displaying not only growing
intellectual conﬁdence in their own, but also showing the ﬂexibility
that is found in societies which have the mixed blessing of a shorter
tradition;3 but when they did so, they invariably felt the need to
* QC, LL.D, (Cantab.), DCL (Oxon.) FBA; Corresponding Member of the Institut de France.
An enlarged version (and with a slightly modiﬁed title) of the 9th Annual Peter Taylor
Memorial Address delivered on 17 May 2006 in the Parliament Chamber of the Inner Temple
at the invitation of the Professional Negligence Bar Association.
1 For instance Lord Campbell’s Act of 1846. For the American statutes see S. Speiser, Recovery
for Wrongful Death, 2nd ed., 1975.
2 For instance Rylands v. Fletcher (1865) 3 H & C 774, 159 E.R. 737, reversed in Fletcher v.
Rylands (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265, aﬃrmed in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, a
decision establishing a general rule of strict liability for the accumulation of any substance on
the defendant’s land likely to do mischief if it escaped. In the case in question, the substance
accumulated was water (to assist a local milling industry), which is escaped through some
disused mine shafts and ﬂooded the low-lying land of the plaintiﬀ. In states like Texas, where
water was and is a scarce commodity and its accumulation should be encouraged and not
penalised, the Texas courts refused to follow the English ruling. See, for instance, Turner v. Big
Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W. 2d 221 (1936), and Leon Green, ‘‘Tort Law Public Law in Disguise’’
(1959) 38 Texas L. Rev. 1, 5.
3 E.g., Lawrence v. Fox 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), where the New York Court of Appeals essentially
decided to depart from the traditional Common law doctrine of privity and recognise contracts
in favour of third parties.
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explain why they chose to go down another path. The reasons
given for distinguishing or rejecting the parent model were often
informative about both systems.4 American courts were thus among
the ﬁrst which would allude openly to the policy reasons which
dictated their results.
Initially, the relative ‘‘poverty’’ of American law was,
undoubtedly, a reason for this willingness to borrow from the
parent system; but it was not the only one. For throughout the
19th century we ﬁnd American jurists of very high intellectual
standing progressively interested in both the law of France and
Germany; and this interest was not limited to the writings of some
of the great Continental jurists of the period (or even earlier
periods) but also extended to innovative legislative schemes.5 By the
turn of the 20th century, the German professoriate as an institution
also came to be held in high esteem among many jurists of renown
in the USA,6 while the celebration of the ﬁrst centenary of the
Code Civil attracted a fair amount of discussion (and Napoleon,
himself, came in for much praise).7 Even the (short-lived) German
school of ‘‘free law’’ found adherents in the USA. By the mid
1920s Karl Llewellyn was to spend much time teaching in
Germany, an experience which was later to be reﬂected in many
German ideas ﬁnding their way in the Uniform Commercial Code.
Though this ﬂirting with Continental Europe decreased rapidly as
the Second World War approached, the end of that War brought to
the United States many ﬁrst class minds (and not only in law) of
German or other central European origin. They represented a
second, unwilling, and more concealed wave of Germanic ideas
crossing the Atlantic and enriched many Law Schools such as those
of Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and, later, Berkeley and Texas to
mention but a few. At the same time Law Schools such as Tulane,
respectably anchored in the civilian tradition, did a good job in
keeping interest in French law alive, especially during the days
when the late Professor ‘‘Ferd’’ Stone used to run its Institute of
Comparative Law. In this climate, even Justinian’s Digest found its
way in a number of American decisions as ‘‘supportive’’ authority
used to alter existing American law, though the borrowing was not
4 For instance, Rowland v. Christian 69 Cal. 2d 198, 443 P. 2d 561 (1968).
5 As for instance Bismarck’s social legislation of the 1880’s which attracted much attention in
the State of New York in the late 1890s.
6 As it did in France after the Franco Prussian war of 1870. For more details on this see Claude
Digeon, La Crise Allemande de la Pense´e Francc¸aise, 1870–1914 (Paris 1959), esp. pp. 364 ﬀ.,
and, more generally, Philippe Jestaz and Christophe Jamin, La Doctrine (Paris 2004), passim.
7 A website search of the articles that appeared in American law journals on the centenary of
the Code Civil shows them to be more than double than those that were published for its 150
years, while the number of articles mentioning, let alone celebrating, the (recent) bicentenary
was a mere trickle.
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always complete or well understood. This transatlantic movement
of ideas has been documented by various authors so it need not
occupy us further.8 Towards the end of this essay, however, we
shall express our concerns about its current decline.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAWAND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Unlike the developments brieﬂy sketched in the previous section,
which concerned the domain of Common law (Europeans might, in
this case, use the word private law with equal accuracy), the same
pattern of imitative thought was not to be found in the domain of
constitutional law and statutory interpretation.9 The radical
diﬀerence of the American Constitution from the unwritten English
model, makes this obvious enough; but the diﬀerences in judicial
interpretation were to become even more obvious in the area of
judicial review of legislation—an indigenous development which has
no real parallel in England and France, found an approximate
equivalent in post-World War II Germany, but which in more
recent times was destined to serve as a model of exportation to
most modern democracies.10
In the USA, in the years that followed the Second World War,
the control of constitutionality of legislation became more than an
issue of legal interpretation. For it became so seriously intertwined
with political arguments and philosophy, especially during the years
of the Warren and Burger Courts,11 that foreign commentators run
the risk of seriously misunderstanding American constitutional law
books and judicial decisions if they do not learn how to read them
in the context of contemporary American political debates.
The importance of the Warren and Burger courts lies, of course,
in the series of liberalising decisions announced in the sixties and
seventies which greatly extended civil rights in a whole range of
areas of daily life. The American ‘‘Right’’12 hated many of these
liberty-enhancing decisions of the Warren Court, especially Roe v.
8 For an excellent collection of essays see Mathias Reimann (ed.), The Reception of Continental
Ideas in the Common Law World 1820–1920 (Berlin 1993).
9 Justice Scalia makes the point with great clarity in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law (Princeton 1997).
10 Among the rich literature see Anthony (now Lord) Lester ‘‘The Overseas Trade in the
American Bill of Rights’’ (1988) 88 Columb. L. Rev. 537.
11 Earl Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower and held oﬃce between 1953 and 1969,
Warren E. Burger was appointed by President Nixon and was at the Supreme Court between
1969 and 1986. For some of the early reactions see A.M. Bickel, Politics and the Warren Court
(New York 1965) and P.B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court (Chicago
1970).
12 Though in modern Europe the terms ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘left’’ are—happily—losing much of their
original appeal (as most parties with real pretensions for power realise that they must occupy
the central ground) in America they are still widely used and have thus been retained here but
without the use of inverted commas.
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Wade13 which they always believed had no roots in the
Constitution; indeed, even liberals like John Hart Ely have
described Roe as not law and not making any eﬀort to pretend to
be law.14 Of course there are theories by which Roe is derived from
the Constitution, but the Right utterly rejects those theories. So the
problem the Right diagnosed to lie at the root of American society
was unbridled judicial discretion leading to constitutionalising the
political preferences of the left, and the remedy was to end (or try
to end) judicial discretion and tie judicial power to a narrow and
formalist theory of interpretation. If the Founding Fathers of the
(American) Constitution did not say it, the judges could not do it.
The theory of ‘‘originalism’’ or ‘‘textualism’’, expounded by
academics such as Robert Bork (President Reagan’s failed nominee
for the US Supreme Court),15 and now ﬁnding its most consistent
and forceful proponent in Justice Antonin Scalia of the United
States Supreme Court16 was thus born.
The importance of this development, in part made possible by
the fact that most of the writing available on interpretation was
dedicated to Common law and not constitutional or statutory
interpretation, is crucial for the understanding of all that follows.17
It must also be combined with two other developments of relatively
recent vintage.
The ﬁrst is that the Supreme Court, especially during the
Rehnquist years, has asserted a monopoly on constitutional
interpretation.18 One American commentator has put it this move
in the following terms: ‘‘The Rehnquist Court’s activism explicitly
denies the people any role in determining the ongoing meaning of
their Constitution, other than by the grace of the Justices
13 410 US 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
14 ‘‘The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade’’ (1973) 82 Yale L.J. 920.
15 The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York 1990); and, more
recently, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Washington, D.C. 2003), an
intemperately phrased exposition of the views of the American Right. The ‘‘originalist’’ view
has by no means gained acceptance by judges, either of liberal or pro-minority hues or even
the Right. For an example of the ﬁrst see Thurgood Marshall ‘‘Reﬂections on the Bicentennial
of the United States Constitution’’. (1980) 101 Harvard L. Rev. 1; and for the second see
Richard Posner, ‘‘What am I, a Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict Constructionism’’
(1987) 197 The New Republic, 23ﬀ For thoughtful academic reactions see the replies to Justice
Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation (next footnote).
16 Justice Scalia’s views can be found in his many judgments but have also been expounded in
summary form in his following writings: A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (Princeton 1997); ‘‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’’ (1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175;
and ‘‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’’, (1989) 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849. Some of his underlying
theories also come through in ‘‘Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis’’ (1990) 40
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581.
17 Though note Lord Bingham’s views reproduced in the previous section of this article about
the diﬀerent kind of interpretation called for by Constitutions compared to ordinary statutes.
18 For instance Texas v. Johnson 491 US 397, 421, 434 (1989).
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themselves’’.19 The second, accepted only by the originalists, is that
when interpreting statutes, the consequences of interpretation are to
be disregarded. Thus, whether in dealing with the Constitution, or
with federal statutes, Justice Scalia and his followers20 believe
themselves to be interpreting a legal text, enacted at a particular
time and place, in terms of the original understanding of that
text—the understanding at the time of its enactment—and the
understanding within the polity entitled to enact it. For the same
reason, these judges refuse to look at the legislative history of
statutes. They do look to the legislative history of the Constitution,
and their explanation for how that is consistent seems to me not
very convincing, but they look to constitutional history for evidence
of original understanding. They sometimes assert the relevance of
the traditions of the American people, but mostly to narrow
constitutional text, not to expand it. As stated, for the same
reasons, they also claim to give little weight to the consequences of
statutory interpretation; and none at all if the statute is clear. In
Scalia’s view, federal judges should have no discretion to make law
or policy. Though, of course, he is not so naive as to think such
discretion can be stamped out, he views its survival as a defect in
the system, resulting from the inability of legislators and
constitution writers to be suﬃciently clear and speciﬁc. Federal
judges thus do not make law, they interpret law that was enacted,
and they interpret it on the basis of original understanding. It is in
this context that one must place the current dislike of foreign ideas,
even as source of inspiration and thought. For, seen in the light of
what we have just described, it is conceptually impossible for
foreign law to cast any light on the question of interpretation.
III. THE DIVIDED COURT
The above has been intended to stress a point an observer of
foreign law can easily miss. Simply put it is this. The ability to read
a foreign text does not mean that the reader will understand
foreign law. This is an error into which even high British judges
have occasionally fallen.21 In one sense, the more learned such a
judge is—English or otherwise—in his own law, the greater the risk
that he will ‘‘ﬁll in gaps’’ in what he does not entirely understand
by subconsciously transposing his own solutions and ideas into the
19 Larry D. Kramer, ‘‘The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court’, (2001) 115
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 130 In similar terms, Sarah K. Harding ‘‘Comparative Reasoning and
Judicial Review’’, (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 409, 449–50.
20 At the time of writing—summer 2005—in the Supreme Court this means Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
21 See, for instance, the criticisms of Lord Cooke in ‘‘An Impossible Distinction’’ (1991) 107
L.Q.R. 46, 57 ﬀ.
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foreign landscape. What we stressed above, albeit brieﬂy, suggests
that American Constitutional law requires a sensitivity towards
American politics. Without, the foreign observer is bound to go
astray.
Yet, if beyond this point, we also gave the impression that the
American interpretative techniques are monolithic, then we have
misled the reader. For the reality is that the American Supreme
Court is not monolithic; its decisions often depend upon shifting
alliances between what is, at present, a court consisting of three
right wingers, three liberal, and three shifting (but otherwise)
conservatively-inclined judges. To make matters both more
intriguing and more complicated for foreign observers, this
composition can (and will soon) change (with long term eﬀects).
For each time an incumbent President appoints justices who reﬂect
his own—Right or liberal—point of view, the eﬀects on law and
thus society can be as serious as his most important foreign or
economic policy decisions and often more lasting in terms of time.
In some cases, it can even be more serious and more long-lasting.
It is thus one of the primary functions of the comparatist to
warn national lawyers against the danger of thinking that they can
understand foreign law simply because they have mastered a
foreign language. The exegesis of foreign law is an art that has to
be learned; and it is, as we have elsewhere explained in detail,22
best begun by comparing comparable and relatively narrow factual
situations. This analysis can then be expanded progressively in a
way that goes more and more into detail into other aspects of the
law, of the political system, and then of the foreign society, itself.
So, what then is the current attitude of the Justices of the
Supreme Court on matters of foreign law? Before attempting to
answer this question, let us clarify a few more immediate points.
First, we are not here talking of cases where foreign law is
applied because the rules of conﬂict of laws so require. Nor,
second, are we talking of foreign law in the sense of public
international law. Nor, ﬁnally, are we thinking of a set of rules that
may be applicable because two or more countries are subject to the
decisional law of some supra-national court—the court of the
European Communities for instance. What we are talking about is
the quantitatively few but qualitatively important type of cases
where the national law is silent, dated, or contradictory, and the
national judge asks himself whether he might be allowed to seek
inspiration from the practice of other sister courts.
22 Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and the Classroom. The Story of the Last
Thirty Five Years (Oxford 2003).
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Remaining always with the American Supreme Court, since
demands of space prevent us from looking at the practice of other
courts, the answer to our question is both simple and confusing:
the justices of the Supreme Court do not speak with one voice.
Indeed, in two of the most controversial and oft-disputed type of
cases—the availability of the death sentence and homosexual
rights—the liberal wing of the court seems—for the time being—to
be winning the battle. Yet for a variety of reasons we shall argue
(or, at least consider) the possibility that the conservative,
orginalist, textualist, view (which we do not share) remains the
more consistent, the most strongly phrased and, in some respects,
even the most stimulating of the two positions one can adopt on
such matters. Let us take these comments in turn.
IV. CONSISTENCY IN OPPOSING FOREIGN LAW AS IRRELEVANT
Those who oppose the use (in any form) of foreign law are
consistent. It is not only foreign ideas they wish to stop from
interpreting statutory texts, it is also contemporary local ones. For
Scalia, the originalist,23 believes that, whether he is dealing with the
Constitution or with federal statutes, he is interpreting a legal text,
enacted at a particular time and place. To understand it and apply
it all he needs to know is the understanding of the text at the time
of its enactment by the polity entitled to enact it.24 With such a
starting point, the possibility of foreign law casting any light on the
enactment in question is not possible—indeed, his approach
precludes foreign law before one even gets to other reasons which
make him hostile towards foreign ideas. If the law he has to apply is
bad or outdated, the change should come from the legislature—
Federal or State. But it is not for the (unelected) judge to impose
his moral values on society through legal sophistry or foreign
borrowings. He has made this point on numerous occasions, most
recently in Roper v. Simmons25 where, however, he again found
himself in the minority.
Scalia’s liberal opponents do not deny the fact that they, too,
have to interpret the American Constitution; but, like Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, they accept that the power to declare the law
‘‘carries with it the power, within limits the duty, to make law
23 See note 16 above.
24 Though this has, occasionally, allowed him to attempt some fairly bold interpretations of the
original understanding of the draftsmen. See, for instance, Kyllo v. United States 533 US 27
(2001): a thermal control device, checking from the outside premises to detect whether
cannabis is grown within, can be treated as violating the unlawful search and seizure clause of
the 4th Amendment.
25 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217ﬀ.
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when none exists’’.26 They also give themselves more freedom as to
where to look for inspiration—and that includes abroad—especially
if foreign practice provides ‘‘signiﬁcant conﬁrmation’’ of the judges’
own conclusions.27
In Printz v. US,28 Justice Breyer, after citing European practices,
expressed the idea as follows:
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those
of other nations, and there may be relevant political and
structural diﬀerences between their systems and our own. (. . .)
But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on
the consequences of diﬀerent solutions to a common
problem—in this case the problem of reconciling central
authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing
autonomy of a smaller constituent entity.
On this issue, which is the one that concerns us here, Justice
O’Connor recently expressed similar views when she stated:
this Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds
with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary
we should not be surprised to ﬁnd congruence between
domestic and international values, especially where the
international community has reached clear agreement—
expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of
individual countries—that a particular form of punishment is
inconsistent with fundamental human rights.29
Earlier, in Atkins v. Virginia,30 Justice Stevens stressed in a note
that used evidence of wide-spread foreign practices that although
this was
by no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative
evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is
consensus among those who have addressed the issue.
As a result of such thinking (and evidence), the execution of
mentally retarded criminals was seen as being prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. More recently, the same happened in the case
of murderers who were under the age of eighteen at the time they
committed their crimes.
The above citations suggest that a sizeable section of the United
States Supreme Court does not see a clear-cut divide between
American and international values, certainly in times such as ours
26 The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven 1921), p. 124.
27 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199.
28 521 US 898, 977 (1997).
29 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1215 (2005). This citation is important. For, though the way foreign law was
presented to the court and used by it may leave much to be desired, it does show that ﬁve
out nine judges were, in principle not opposed to the idea of looking at foreign law.
30 536 US 304, 316 note 21 (2002).
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when national borders have become porous and notions of justice
as well as taste seem increasingly to be cut out of the same cloth.
Of course, many in the United States would not share this view
and insist that on a whole range of issues, such as for instance the
death penalty, homosexual rights, abortion, child chastisement, and
other such issues, Americans hold diﬀerent, one might say sterner,
views and, more importantly, they are inﬂuencing not only political
decisions but also legal thinking.
Yet on closer analysis America is a very diverse country and
cannot be said to hold monolithic views. Often, the attitude one
gets to a particular issue depends on the way the question is asked.
For instance, even on the death sentence, though it is constantly
favoured by Gallup poll results and a majority of States have it on
the statute books, nearly a third of these states refuse to carry it
out.31 A closer analysis of such statistics does not reveal as clear a
national consensus as the American Right believes to exist but a
confusing pattern of reactions which, one must say it again, is
reﬂected in judicial opinions. Yet even if we are wrong in our view
that the attitude towards the death sentence is truly nuanced, we
feel Arthur Chaskalson, the President of the South African
Constitutional Court, put the matter correctly in the South African
death penalty case when he wrote:
If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need
for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could
then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the
public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate
is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary
sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established
by the 1993 Constitution. By the same token the issue of the
constitutionality of capital punishment cannot be referred to a
referendum, in which a majority view would prevail over the
wishes of any minority. The very reason for establishing the
new legal order, and for vesting the power of judicial review of
all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights
adequately through the democratic process. Those who are
entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and
marginalised people of our society. It is only if there is
willingness to protect the worst and weakest amongst us, that
all of us can be secure that our own rights will be protected.32
Roper’s use of foreign ideas in a ‘‘supplementary’’ manner is
attractive. Yet its full implications still have to be worked out. For,
31 Thus, at the time of writing, there exist twelve ‘‘abolitionist’’ states, twenty-four ‘‘symbolic’’
states (recognising the death penalty but rarely practising it) and a further fourteen states
being ‘‘executing’’ states. With the exception of Arizona, the other ‘‘executing’’ States coincide
with the so-called ‘‘bible-belt’’ area of the USA.
32 1995 (3) SA 391, para. [88] (CC).
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it gives no clue when this is permissible and when it is not.33 Most
(but not all) of the foreign material used by the US Supreme Court
has been in the context of the death penalty and homosexual rights;
and it has been brought into play be relying on the Eighth
Amendment which prohibits ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’, a
phrase with a special meaning when it was enacted, but now to be
interpreted against the background of ‘‘changing circumstances’’ or,
as the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence calls them, ‘‘evolving
standards of decency’’. Can it/should it also come into play in
other instances, not involving the Eighth Amendment, for instance
the ‘‘due process clause’’? The question awaits a deﬁnitive answer.
Roper’s view of foreign law also seems more tentative than that
adopted by the Privy Council decisions of the last ten years or so
where foreign decisional law (and other material) was more readily
accepted as an integral part of the entire reasoning process; but
more about this below.34
Likewise, those who have advocated the use of foreign law do
not seem to have given clear guidance whether it can be used to
enlarge rights (contained in the Constitution) or also restrict them.
Up to now, the practice of the Supreme Court has been to use
foreign ideas to extend rights—hence the complaints by the
American Right. Jurists who tend to oppose the use of foreign law
have tended to see this point as an important one and thus raise
the question given at the beginning of this paragraph.35 Thus, could
one, for instance, invoke the German Constitution36 or the most
recent decision of the Strasbourg Court in the Caroline case37 and
argue that privacy rights should be balanced against speech rights
and thus, restrict the famous First Amendment? For us, by parity
of reasoning, the same answer—in principle—should apply whether
one is using the foreign model as a reason to expand or restrict
local rights. For, ultimately, what really matters is the convincing
force of the foreign rule and not whether it expands or restricts
national law. But one can imagine, once again, the howls of
anguish that would come from a section of the American society,
especially the Press, at this prospect.
33 For instance see Justice Scalia’s point in Roper v. Simmons 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1228: ‘‘To invoke
alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned
decision-making, but sophistry’’. Yet, with respect, this statement is, itself, sophistry for why
cannot one invoke the use of foreign law only where its relevance can be demonstrated?
34 For more details, see section 9 below.
35 Justice Scalia’s ‘‘dialogue’’ with his critics in A Matter of Interpretation reveals, in our view,
the diversity of opinions in the camp of his opponents.
36 Articles 1 and 2, discussed in detail (in English) in Markesinis and Unberath, The German
Law of Torts: A Comparative Introduction, 4th ed. (Oxford 2002), pp. 392 ﬀ and 412 ﬀ.
37 ECtHR No. 59320/00 of 24 June 2004.
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Finally, those who advocate the use of foreign law have also
failed to address the question in what form this material should be
introduced to the (potentially) borrowing court and how best this
should be considered by it. We return to this important objection in
subsection 6, below.
These ‘‘omissions’’, taken as a whole, are seen by those who
oppose the use of foreign law as a sign of loose or incomplete
thinking on the part of those who favour the open model. The
‘‘originalists’’, on the other hand, enjoy the beneﬁt of a clear and
unswerving rule. Or so at least they believe.
V. STRONGLY PHRASED REJECTION OF RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN LAW
The opponents of foreign law have also had an impact in the
United States (though, arguably not elsewhere) because of the
strong and emotive use of language they have used to express their
opposition to it. This may not be particularly appealing to jurists;
but in the currently polarised American political scene, it has
helped galvanise the support of those who share these views. In the
current political climate in the USA law feeds on politics and vice
versa. Here, for instance is how Justice Scalia opposed the
liberalisation of sodomy laws in the recent Texas decision of
Lawrence v. Texas. He said:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because
some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on
certain behaviour. Much less do they spring into existence, as
the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations
decriminalise conduct. (. . .) The Court’s discussion of these
foreign views (. . .) is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous
dicta, however, since ‘‘this court (. . .) should not impose foreign
moods, fads or fashions on Americans’’.38
It is the italicised end of the quotation that will arrest the attention
of the foreign reader. And yet it is the opening statement that
holds the key to the Scalia doctrine, gives it coherence, and also
earns it its opponents. For, paraphrasing it, it states that
contemporary law reform in the American States and, a fortiori, in
foreign countries, cannot change the original understanding of the
US Constitution.
Yet, how we speak often says much about how we think, and
Justice Scalia’s words (‘‘foreign moods, fads or fashions . . .’’) talk
volumes of how he perceives the underlying ‘‘values’’ that are
currently shaping the case law of foreign courts, many of which are
comparable in standing to his own not only in form but also in
38 Foster v. Florida, 537 US 990, n. (2002) (Thomas, J.)
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achievements.39 To begin with he sees them as ‘‘passing fads and
fashions’’, not responses to changing habits and values experienced
by modern societies. That these diﬀerent values or views can
equally strongly and honestly be held by others does not seem to
be allowed by the words he uses. That Justice Scalia is, indeed,
using these words in a pejorative manner can also be seen from his
earlier dictum in Atkins, where he wrote:40
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘‘world community’’,
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of
our people . . . (italics added).
Other jurists of the American ‘‘Right’’ have used even more vivid
language to express their dislike of European criticism of American
‘‘insularity’’. Thus, Professor Robert Bork has referred41 to
academics who like the present author argue for an open mind, as
socialist, anti-religious, ‘‘faux intellectuals . . . [hoping] to outﬂank
American legislatures by [imposing] liberal views on the United
States’’. And at pages 24–5 of the same book he described the
European reaction to Justice Kennedy’s reluctance to cite in
Stantford v. Kentucky42 foreign law as ‘‘insolent browbeating’’. A
glance at the Privy Council decisions cited brieﬂy in section 9,
below, and showing how widely held these views are by some of the
most eminent judges of our times makes one wonder whether, on
reﬂection, Professor Bork might be happier to withdraw the
description ‘‘faux intellectuals’’ which, according to his thinking,
would seem to apply to all of the above.
Professor Bork, who after an animated Senate hearing was
rejected as President Reagan’s nominee as a Justice to the Supreme
Court, may, conceivably, have personal reasons for adopting such
strident language. But the greatest irony must surely be that the
judge he defended for siding with the majority in Standford v.
Kentucky and refusing to take into account foreign law—Justice
Kennedy—was fated to be the judge who gave the majority
decision in the most recent death penalty case of Roper v. Simmons
which did indeed invoke foreign law as a supplementary reason for
the changed outcome. This must be more than ironical. For it
oﬀers a good example of the how the ‘‘time factor’’ can legitimise
the use of foreign law, reversing old practices when there are
reliable signs that public mores have changed. And by ‘‘time
39 For who can deny the democratic credentials of the German Constitutional Court which has
achieved in law a revolution similar in importance and amplitude to the so called post-War
economic miracle.
40 536 US 304, at 347–8.
41 Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges, pp. 2–16.
42 492 US 361 (1989).
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factor’’ we refer here to another neglected element in comparative
studies namely how the passage of time may alter societies and
ideas and thus not only call for a diﬀerent interpretation of dated
words but also make change and transplantation possible where,
only a few years earlier, it was believed to have been impossible.
VI. THE STIMULATING SIDE OF ‘‘NEGATIVISM’’
Unlike the South African Constitution of 1995, which deliberately
left the question of the death penalty to be decided by the newly
established Constitutional court, the American Constitution in
several of its provisions makes it clear that it recognises this
extreme sanction. Thus, the moderating impact of modern views on
this matter has only been felt through the Eighth Amendment and
its prohibition of ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’—a term as
already indicated understood to take into account the ‘‘evolving
standards of decency’’. It was reliance on this ‘‘escape phrase’’ that
thus allowed the Supreme Court to overrule in Atkins v. Virginia43
its earlier decisions in Penry v. Lynaugh44 and proscribe the death
sentence in the case of mentally incapacitated persons and, more
recently, to overrule in Roper v. Simmons45 its earlier decision in
Standford v. Kentucky46 and prohibit the carrying out of a death
sentence in the case of persons who committed murder while under
the age of 18 years.
Both landmark changes were ﬁve to four decisions reﬂecting the
political divisions in the court but also the importance of the
‘‘swing votes’’. For in Roper, Justice Kennedy, delivering the
majority opinion, relied (as he did not in Stanford) on foreign
practice to bolster the conclusion reached by himself and his
colleagues in the majority on the basis of the ‘‘internal’’ review of
the changing pattern of State practices. He then proceeded to add:47
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for oﬀenders under 18 ﬁnds conﬁrmation in the
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give oﬃcial sanction to the juvenile
death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our
responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court’s
decision in Trop,48 the Court has referred to the laws of other
43 536 US 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242.
44 492 US 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934.
45 125 S. Ct. 1183.
46 492 US 361, 109 S. Ct. 2969.
47 ‘‘Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today,
the views of other countries and the so-called international community take centre stage’’. (per
Justice Scalia, at p. 1225).
48 Trop v. Dulles 356 US 86, 102–3, 78 S.Ct. 590 (plurality opinion).
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countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘‘cruel
and unusual punishments’’.
We italicise the word ‘‘bolster’’ since Justice Kennedy was eager to
stress that while ‘‘(T)he opinion of the world community, [does not
control the outcome], [it] does provide respected and signiﬁcant
conﬁrmation for our conclusions mainly reached on other
grounds’’.
Yet the ‘‘negativist’’ approach of the originalists has also some
advantages, and among them is the condemnation of judges who
choose to impose their own views about morality, by-passing the
constitutional wording (as original understood). It is thus
permissible to downplay the caveat indicated by the italicised word
of Justice Kennedy in order to support the view that the Court was
here doing more than simply interpreting the law of the USA. This
criticism of Justice Kennedy’s stance, strongly voiced by the
dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, is at the very least arguable
since due regard must be had to the fact that the ‘‘shift’’ in court
practice that took place between Stanford v. Kentucky49 and Roper
v. Simmons in favour of abolishing the death penalty for juveniles
was much lower (namely 4)50 compared to that which justiﬁed the
Court in Atkins v. Virginia51 to overrule Penry v. Lynaugh52 (16
States passing speciﬁc statutes since the earlier case was decided).
Justice Scalia may thus have been right when pointing out the
unreliable basis of the test which now allows the Supreme Court to
ﬁnd (on the basis of arguably slim evidence) that there has been a
shift from previous practice. For this now makes it easier for the
Court to detect a ‘‘shift’’ in national consensus rather than insist, as
it arguably used to do, on an ‘‘overwhelming opposition to a
challenged practice’’.53
Though this author feels that there is, among political and legal
circles, a clear world-wide opposition to the death penalty, he also
recognises that this may not reﬂect the views of the voter in the
street (be he English or American). This means that the accusation
that the judge ‘‘importing’’ such a reform may thus be supplanting
his own view for that of the electorate is not one which can be
ignored though one, equally, cannot ignore that legislative reform is
not always easy to achieve because of the fudges which current
political realities tend to promote. Thus, the ﬁnal answer on this
49 492 US 361, 109 S. Ct. 590.
50 Plus one State Supreme Court had construed the State’s death penalty statute not to apply to
the under-18 oﬀenders: State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 458, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (1993).
51 536 US 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242.
52 492 US 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934.
53 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1218.
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point must be that the issue here is not one that lends itself to easy
answers and that the ‘‘originalists’’, through their persistent
opposition (negativisim) towards the use of foreign law, may be
rendering comparative law a service in so far as they are alerting
jurists of all hues of the need to address these points more cogently.
Merely quoting that most states have abolished the death sentence
may not, on its own, be enough. For in appropriate circumstances,
one may need additional information. For instance, does a state
have the death sentence on the statute books but does not enforce
it? Does life imprisonment mean, in practice, life imprisonment (as
it does in the USA) or does it mean that parole rules can,
eﬀectively, make a mockery of the term?
The Scalia dissent may have oﬀered a further service to
comparative law when doubting the ‘‘form’’ in which the
(apparently) universal practice towards juvenile death sentencing
was presented. This took the form of amicus briefs, was not
discussed or contradicted in open court, and the way the data was
collected was never tested in a scientiﬁc way.54 This, of course, does
not speak conclusively against the use of evidence of foreign law
before a national court but it does suggest that, for instance, the
way in which this was handled by the House of Lords in Fairchild
v. Glenhaven55 was more convincing. For there, their lordships
themselves asked Counsel for both sides to address them on the
attitudes taken by the Supreme Courts of Continental Europe on
the issue there at hand and, when dealing with that information
they, themselves, added that the material had to be used with
caution. Thus Lord Bingham argued that:56
Development of the law in this country [the UK] can not of
course depend on a head count of decisions and codes adopted
in other countries around the world, often against a
background of diﬀerent rules and traditions. The law must be
developed coherently, in accordance with principle, so as to
serve, even-handedly, the ends of justice. If however a decision
is given in this country which oﬀends one’s basic sense of
justice, and if consideration of international sources suggests
that a diﬀerent and more acceptable decision would be given in
most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this
must prompt review of the decision in question.
The cautionary remarks made in this sub-section are only intended
to address the attention of the reader to another (healthy) warning
advanced by those opposing the use of foreign law. But if this
warning, once again, criticises, the way that foreign law is studied
54 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1221.
55 [2002] 1 A.C. 32.
56 Ibid., at p. 66.
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in Universities and presented to national courts, it does not imply
that if the right methodological way towards foreign law can be
developed its utility cannot increase in the years to come. We can
thus only conclude by referring the reader to a very detailed
consideration of the dangers and diﬃculties of comparative law
which we have attempted with a colleague of ours and assure him
that to most of these worries satisfactory answers seem to be
emerging at a pace quicker than ever before in the history of
comparative law.
VII. WIDER REASONS WHICH MAY HELP THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF
INSULARITY SPREAD EVEN FURTHER
Though one can criticise the way practising lawyers57 have tried to
introduce foreign law in American constitutional litigation, the real
obstacle to the use of foreign law is this native belief that it should
have no role to play in the shaping of American law. At the risk of
repetition, we also stress again that this ‘‘lack of interest’’ in foreign
ideas must also be seen against the wider context of the American
political debate about the proper role of judges—something which
we have made a leitmotif of this paper since so few non-American
lawyers are genuinely able to evaluate it fully.
Yet, what (plausibly) applies to constitutional interpretation
may, as stated, already be (implausibly) infecting interpretation in
the area of private law, as well, contradicting a well-established
contrary practice. All this spreading of the ‘‘introversion disease’’
may be aided and abetted by an ‘‘opposite disease’’, in the
ascendancy at the moment among the governing political elites.
This is founded in the belief that America is ‘‘a city on the hill’’,
better than others but—and this is the most modern trend—morally
bound to improve others who do not attain its own standards.58
This sounds like a tall order yet, indisputably, there are many
politicians, journalists, and even lawyers, who see in the United
States an example to the world: the one that ﬁrst implemented
democracy, protected human rights, recognised judicial review, and
now re-proclaims the merits of a property-owning nation, with its
citizens taking their fate in their hands. This is to say nothing of its
own type of capitalism which, though prone to suﬀer from greed, is
also promoted as the only way of increasing standards of living.
57 And the writers of amicus briefs which are used in American courts but not in England or
France.
58 These key words, coming from John Winthrop’s address on the founding of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony (and probably derived from Matthew 5:14). As the phrase became
‘‘politicised’’ over the ages, and certainly after the ‘‘Reagan years’’ when it became often cited,
it lost its cautionary note and became simply ‘‘we are an example to the world’’.
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One may debate to what extent these American claims are
justiﬁed and not exaggerated. One must at least question whether
America has any right to ‘‘force’’ others to adopt its values rather
than merely rely on the superiority of its ideas and ideals to attract
their own adherents—something which, of course, works both
ways. But what cannot be in doubt is the fact that many
Americans—especially those who form the ruling elites of today—
believe in the superiority of their values. Such beliefs thus form
part of the current ‘‘political climate’’ that we ﬁnd in this great (in
more ways than one) country; and they are reinforced, in the minds
of many Americans, by non-legal arguments such as the
contemporary European reservations about America’s
transformation of public international law to suit its foreign policy.
Reason and sentiment—moral, political, religious, and economic—
thus seem to combine with legal concerns to produce an ‘‘unstable’’
mix the likes of which has rarely been encountered in the history of
comparative law and the movement of ideas. Taken together they
must account for the growing suspicion which a substantial
proportion of the American population (including lawyers) nurtures
towards contemporary Europe, its values, its law, and its courts. A
fear or dislike of foreign values nowadays thus comes with a very
inadequate understanding of the ‘‘rest of the world’’, its
sensitivities, its structures, its law and its achievements. That is why
we repeat our earlier conviction that however inept lawyers may
have been in trying to interest American courts in foreign law, the
main cause of resistance must be sought elsewhere
This emerging and complex picture of America’s self-conscious
superiority may thus make it adverse to borrowings and intellectual
dialogues even in the areas where once there was give and take and
which the more globalised economic and commercial world we live
in makes even more necessary. Yet here, the movement of ideas on
technical matters that are regulated by the kind of rules we are
envisaging, should be facilitated and not impeded out of abstract
notions of principle which may be relevant to the constitutional
group of cases but not this category of disputes.
In making the above suggestion we do not, of course, delude
ourselves in believing that it will stop opponents of all forms of
foreign dialogue from trying to prevent it even in the case of
comparison of rules (and not values). For it does not take much
ingenuity but only a minimum amount of disingenuousness to claim
that, for instance, even ordinary contract or tort rules can be linked
to ‘‘values’’ held dear by some societies in order to preserve the
status quo. Thus, any teacher of contract law in almost every state
on the European continent will be aware of the growing number of
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rules favouring consumer protection. Almost all—certainly those
which strive for greater employment protection—could be declared
as incompatible with the American form of capitalism which seems
hell-bent since the 1980s to unpick the New Deal revolution of the
1930s and return closer to the nineteenth century ideal of laissez
faire. Those who imagine European (including English) lawyers as
being all ‘‘socialists’’, ‘‘anti-religious’’, ‘‘faux intellectuals’’ will
certainly be tempted to try this tack.
The same could, likewise, be argued in the domain of tort
rules,59 which in Europe are, admittedly, fashioned against the
reality of a safety net provided by a more developed system of
social security. The conclusion of this sub-section thus is that the
more America becomes anxious to assert its interests globally and
export its institutions, the less sensitive it has become to diﬀerent
values if they are incompatible with those held by its ruling elites.
The fact that a section of its judiciary do not seem to share this
view does not mean that in the current political climate they are set
to get their way. The next two or three nominations in the United
States Supreme Court could prove of crucial importance for at least
one generation of Americans. Europeans should also take stock.
VIII. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER WORLD COURTS
What is remarkable about the above scene is that, while it has been
hardening in the way suggested, the supreme courts of almost all
the major legal systems have made signiﬁcant strides towards using
foreign law as a source of local inspiration. In this category one
thus ﬁnds some very unlikely bed-fellows: the House of Lords, for
long considered (by outsiders) as an enclave of tradition and
conservatism; the Canadian Supreme Court, a modern champion of
constructive but not slavish engagement with its southern large
neighbour; the South African Constitutional Court, a newcomer
with an enviable record of comparative law in action; and, to
complete this short list, even the Israeli Supreme Court which has
shown itself able to borrow in matters of human rights from a wide
range of cultures even when this led to internal opposition based
on strong religious views. The contrast with the United States is
thus not only great; it also raises another interesting question
namely which of the two models—the open or the closed—will, in
the end, prove more attractive to the emerging democracies and, in
the long run, the most formidable of all emerging powers: China.
59 A host of tort rules—e.g., class actions suits, capping of damages, availability of punitives—
could fall into this category. For restrictions imposed on any of them would, in Europe, be
seen as reﬂecting tort choices where, in the United States, many would regard them as giving
a free hand to enterprises to place proﬁt before social responsibility.
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We have pondered over some of these questions elsewhere60 so here
suﬃce it to conclude with some very speciﬁc conclusion aimed at
our English audience.
IX. SOME SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS FOR ENGLISH COURTS AND JURISTS
So far, much of this article has focused on American law and the
kind of challenges and problems it presents to foreign observers. In
this context, we have advanced the thesis that it is in these
‘‘internal’’ political disputes—the internal ‘‘clash of cultures’’
between the religious Right and the liberal Left, as some have
called it—that we must seek the explanation for the perceived
irrelevance of foreign law though, in recent years, the ‘‘Right’’ has
also been articulating additional reasons for mistrusting foreign,
especially European, ideas. But are there are any other lessons that
can be drawn from the current debate in the USA for the beneﬁt of
English lawyers? Here are ﬁve reﬂections, unequally developed; and
more could be added if one had the time and space to examine the
American examples in closer comparative juxtaposition with the
case law of other systems.
(a) First Reﬂection
On the narrow (but important) issue of the death penalty, how
have the English judges performed compared with their American
counterparts? The question cannot be brushed aside as being
academic because the death penalty has been abolished in the UK.
This is because the Privy Council has, in the recent past, had many
occasions when it has been forced to consider related issues coming
to them in the form of appeals from the Caribbean islands and its
decisions undoubtedly provide food for thought. These decisions
say much about our judges, their receptiveness to foreign law, and
their form of reasoning. Five points in particular need to be
stressed under this heading.
First, focusing on just three decisions—Pratt,61 but mainly
Reyes62 and Matthew63—one must admit that the Privy Council
opinions have made good, indeed, extensive use of foreign law and,
unlike the American courts, made no apologies for this. In fact, the
foreign law cited in these opinions is neither ‘‘ornamental’’ nor
‘‘supportive’’ of a result already reached on other grounds but
forms an essential part of the Board’s reasoning. Thus, to the
60 This is attempted in great detail by Basil Markesinis and Jo¨rg Fedtke in ‘‘The Judge as
Comparatist’’, the 2005 Eason-Weinmann Lecture, (2005) 81 Tulane L. Rev. 11.
61 Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica [1994] 2 A.C. 1.
62 Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 235.
63 Charles Matthew v. The State [2005] A.C. 433.
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extent that foreign law forms an integral part of the reasoning of
these (criminal) cases it diﬀers, qualitatively, from the use made of
foreign ideas by the House of Lords in matters of private or
commercial law where, though increasing in frequency, it remains
somewhat timid.
Second, if private law lags behind—and we think it does—
human rights law, what is the position in speciﬁc areas of private
law such as commercial law and international ﬁnance? Clearly,
these topics must be studied further before one can develop any
plausible thesis. Yet one can, from the outset, state one’s
impression that these are areas of the law where the Common law
could provide a considerable lead to modern civilian systems. And
I see this as a growth area both for academics but also for
practitioners given the City’s pre-eminent position in such matters.
To put it diﬀerently, this is a potential ‘‘export’’ area for the
Common law.
The third point is related to the previous one. The comparative
element in these cases has been aided by the fact that most of the
constitutions of these islands use notions and language which owe
much to both the English and American legal traditions and texts.
It is thus worth noting the ease with which the members of the
Privy Council slip from English into American and then back into
English texts. Indeed, one might describe this ease as excessive in so
far as the references to the 8th Amendment do not always make
clear the particular American diﬃculties64 over the meaning of the
crucial words ‘‘evolving standards of decency’’ which have given the
liberal justices the peg on which to hang their use of foreign law.
One further wonders how long it will take before other general
phrases in the American constitution—e.g., the ‘‘due process’’
clause—also become ‘‘gateways’’ for foreign ideas to enter
American constitutional litigation.
Fourthly, the breadth of the citations found in the Privy Council
decisions goes further than the two jurisdictions mentioned, with
South African and Canadian cases attracting almost as much
attention as American. Taken together and along with references to
various ‘‘international’’ instruments and conventions, the above
goes to show that in the area of human rights the globalisation of
law has taken huge forward strides making it nowadays virtually
impossible to attempt to solve a problem by interpreting solely
‘‘national’’ law. A related point is that comparatively minded judges
no longer have one (other) model to compare their law with, i.e.,
the law of the United States’ Supreme Court. Does this mean that
64 This obvious when comparing carefully Justice Scalia’s judgment in Roper v. Simmons 125 S.
Ct. 1183 with those of Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor.
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with the passage of time, attention to what other legal systems do
will grow in this country? And will this broadening of the horizons
be limited to English speaking courts, or will others, such as the
German or the French, attract more attention than they have
hitherto done? The extensive use which the South African
Constitutional Court has made of German Constitutional case law
and doctrine suggests that the ‘‘language factor’’ is more of an
excuse than an impediment for such forays into foreign but original
legal systems. This need to look at advanced civil law systems may
also grow as more and more lawyers in this country become
accustomed to the new reality, namely that English and American
law may no longer be as close as most think. In Roper once again
Justice Scalia did English lawyers a considerable service by bursting
the bubble of a ‘‘special Anglo-American relationship’’65 which
many can still not bring themselves to do in law or in politics. This
is a subject worthy of an article in itself!
Our ﬁnal observation about the Privy Council decisions touch
upon an important concern stressed by American judges who
oppose the use of foreign law. For the Privy Council decisions
address squarely and, it is submitted, more thoroughly, the fear
that, by invoking foreign law, a judge is only buttressing his own
predilections and moral values which he is then trying to substitute
for what the Constitution actually provides in its text. This is a fear
that we must begin to take seriously ourselves even in this country,
especially in the light of recent ‘‘clashes’’ between Home Secretaries
(and Shadow Home Secretaries) and our judiciary. Yet we submit
that in both Reyes and Matthews Lords Bingham and Hoﬀmann
address this point. In Matthews, for instance, Lord Bingham
elaborated from the outset of his judgment this view by re-stating
the orthodox position but also adding a subtle proviso. He thus
said:
The [Privy Council] has of course recognised that the
provisions of any constitution must be interpreted with care
and respect, paying close attention to the terms of the
constitution in question. But it has also brought to its task of
constitutional adjudication a broader vision, recognizing that a
legalistic and over literal approach to interpretation may be quite
inappropriate when seeking to give eﬀect to the rights, values
and standards expressed in a constitution as these evolve over
time.
The italicised words emphasise the crucial diﬀerence from the
‘‘originalists’’. Lord Bingham also gives an attractive twist to his
argument when he invokes more than the ‘‘time factor’’ to justify
65 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1227–8.
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the need for his ‘‘up-dating’’ interpretive techniques and, in this
sense, his judgment could be of use to those in the United States
who feel instinctive sympathy with his position. He thus states:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially diﬀerent
from that construing a statute. A statute deﬁnes present rights
and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A
constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future.
Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the
legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by
a Bill or Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of
individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions
cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must therefore be
capable of growth and development over time to meet new
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its
framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and
must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in
mind. Professor Paul Freund expressed the idea aptly when he
admonished the American courts ‘‘not to read the provisions
of the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become
one’’.66
Before I continue with other views expressed in this same judgment
allow me to diverge for a moment and stress that Lord Bingham’s
views about the peculiarities of constitutional interpretation are not
only convincing and elegantly crafted but also happen to agree
entirely with those found in the German system. And I choose to
stress Germany not only because it has a system which has
attracted my interest for a long time but mainly because since it
has one of the oldest, if not most sophisticated, system of rules of
statutory construction going back at least to 1840 when Savigny67
developed the four basic norms of grammatical, historical,
contextual and purposive interpretation. Now though these norms
were devised for the interpretation of statutory private law (which
was, after all the main preoccupation of that time), they have, on
the whole, been accepted also for public law though also have also
been modiﬁed to take into account that constitutions are (a)
durable documents; (b) tend to contain vaguely drafted provisions;
and (c) are political in nature requiring a mixture of legal and
pragmatic political analysis.68 Their texts, therefore, in the words of
a great German constitutional expert69 cannot
66 2004 WL 1372517, at p. 8.
67 Das System des heutigen Ro¨mischen Rechts, vol. I, s. 33 (Berlin 1840), especially at 213–4.
68 The literature is vast so I draw the reader’s attention to two classic works: Konrad Hesse,
Grundzuge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland s. 2 II 1, 16th ed. (Karlsruhe
1988); Winfried Brugger, Rundfunkfreiheit und Verfassungsinterpretation (Heidelberg 1991).
69 Winfried Brugger ‘‘Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some
Remarks from a German Point of View’’ (1994) 42 Amer. J. Comp. L. 395 and 398.
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be ‘‘construed’’ (ausgelegt) but must be ‘‘actualised’’
(aktualisiert) or ‘‘concretised’’ (konkretisiert); the diﬀerence
being that a strict ‘‘construction’’ reveals a solution already
inherent in the text, whereas an ‘‘actualisation’’ or
‘‘concretisation’’ entails a dialectic process of creatively
determining results in conformity with, but not determinable
by, the Constitution.
But let us return to our Privy Council decision and other views
given about the proper way to interpret constitutional provisions.
In his dissent, Lord Nicholls returned to this theme and we
stress this since it is so diﬀerent from that adopted by the
American Right.70 He said:
I do not believe the framers of these constitutions ever
intended the existing laws savings provisions should operate to
deprive the country’s citizens of the protection aﬀorded by
rising standards set by human rights values. The saving clauses
are intended to smooth the transition, not to freeze standards
for ever . . . This is not to substitute the personal predilections
of individual judges for the chosen language of the
constitution. Rather, it is a recognition that the values
underlying a constitution should be given due weight when the
constitution falls to be interpreted in changed conditions.
(b) Second Reﬂection
The second reﬂection from the earlier observations about the
American scene demonstrates how necessary it is to try to
understand foreign judicial attitudes by seeing them within its wider
context of the political debates taking place in their own countries.
The Scalia, type arguments must thus be clearly seen as part and
parcel of the American Right’s reaction to the liberal decision of
their Supreme Court in the late sixties and seventies. Yet the views
expressed in the Privy Council decisions referred to above about the
proper limits of interpretation ﬁnd almost universal support. The
rich references to other jurisdictions given in the Privy Council and
alluded to earlier on show clearly that they have strong adherents
among important judges, almost the world over. Such statistical
syllogism not only reinforces one’s belief that, by adopting such a
stance, one is on the right track; it also shows how basic human
rights and their interpretation are, as never before, seen to be cut
out of the same cloth. If one accepts this view and then couples it
with the undoubted reality that we live in a world with porous
70 Though one can forget sometimes that similar thoughts have also been expressed by American
courts in the past (for instance, Weems v. United States 317, 349 (1910)) and powerfully
supported by Supreme Court justices even in our times. Thus, see William Brennan Jr. ‘‘The
Constitution of the United States. Contemporary Ratiﬁcation’’, reprinted in David M.
O’Brien, Judges on Judging: Views from the Bench (Washington, DC 2004), p. 183.
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borders, one must surely foresee an enhanced (and not reduced)
judicial dialogue in the future. The Privy Council decisions thus
lend their force to similar attitudes found in such other major legal
systems as the Canadian and the South African.
(c) Third Reﬂection
Despite the warnings sounded earlier on, one must not—de lege
ferenda—be content to tolerate judicial introvertedness of the
American kind. For if this spirit is allowed to spread further in the
United States it could aﬀect or, should one say, infect the way they
interpret legal rules, even on matters which appear to belong to the
realm of so-called black letter law. For even such rules as pertain to
the domains of contract or tort, could, easily, be linked to wider
political and economic decisions and thus lead those who oppose
even the mere consideration of foreign ideas to oppose such
reasoning by falling back on these wider considerations. Again,
some instances were given in the text above and need not be
discussed further.71
(d) Fourth Reﬂection
Fourthly, the ingenuity of invoking local ‘‘environmental’’ factors,
ranging from ﬁscal policy to religion, can easily be invoked as an
opposing force to any attempt to consider (even be inspired) by
foreign law. This has happened in America and also in our country.
Yet one must look with admiration at some of the decisions of the
Israeli Supreme Court to see how bold judges (such as its current
President) have managed to borrow, for instance, from Canadian
Human Rights law, and transform local law despite ﬁerce
opposition from extreme conservative religious sections of their
society. In El Al Airlines Ltd. v. Danilowitz72 a three-judge panel
Israeli Supreme Court proved transplantation was possible even in
one of the most sensitive of areas on which local religious feelings
have clear cut views (homosexual rights). Thus, Justice Dorner
indulged in an extensive use of comparative (mainly Canadian) law
71 In passing, however, one could refer to the prolonged dispute in the USA some ﬁfteen years
ago as to whether the American law of civil procedure could be made more eﬃcient by
adopting managerial type characteristics found in other systems such as the German. On this
see: Ronald J. Allen, Stephan Kock, Kurt Reichenberg and D. Toby Rosen, ‘‘The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative
Scholarship’’, (1988) 82 NW U. L. Rev. 705 to which Professor Langbein replied ‘‘The
German Advantage’’, (1988) 82 NW U. L. Rev. 763. Allen’s riposte, entitled ‘‘Idealisation and
Caricature in Comparative Scholarship’’, appeared in (1988) 82 NW U. L. Rev. 785. Others
joined the fray. Thus, see John H. Merryman, ‘‘How Others Do It: The French and German
Judiciaries’’, (1988) 61 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1865 and John C. Reitz, ‘‘Why We Probably Cannot
Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure’’, (1990) 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987. The articles
mentioned in the next note show that the discussion is not abating but, on the contrary, it is
now acquiring a new, sociological dimension.
72 (1994) 48(5) P.D. 749.
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as did Justice Barak who, as a result, in fact nearly lost his
scheduled promotion to the post of President of the Court.73 And,
closer to home, one can ponder Sir Otto Kahn-Freund’s doubts,
expressed in the mid seventies,74 as to whether Irish law could ever
change and adopt divorce (or, one could add, abortion) given the
strong opposition of the Catholic Church. Yet this prediction,
based on the local ‘‘environment’’ opposing legal change, was
disproved in the space of about twenty years! This does not
diminish Sir Otto’s intellectual gifts; it only shows how rapidly
modern societies are evolving and, in many respects, moving away
from their own roots.
Reading this literature one may further be led to ask whether
the opposition to foreign ideas may not often come from local and,
one might even call them, mundane forces even though they also
represent formidable obstacles to be overcome. I am thinking now
of the organisation of the local profession, legal or medical, local
habits, and local insurance practices. Here, much of the opposition
may be fuelled by fears which have never been proved or disproved
but which interested groups can exaggerate in their pursuit of their
own agendas. Let me give but two instances: the recognition of a
tort of privacy and the doctrine of informed consent in medical
malpractice cases.
The creation of a right of privacy has been impeded on many
grounds which I have, elsewhere, explained why I ﬁnd to be
unconvincing. But one often used is pragmatic: if privacy was
recognised as an independent heading of liability it would open the
ﬂoodgates of litigation. In my treatise on the German Law of
Torts, co-authored with Dr. Hannes Unberath of the University of
Munich, we showed how the number of cases which have reached
the higher German Courts during the last twenty years is less than
two hundred and ﬁfty. If the existence of a tort of privacy in
Germany, where access to courts is cheap and the litigation
mentality is developed, has only produced such a small sample,
what empirical evidence can the English opponents of privacy
adduce that in this country where recourse to courts is seen as the
ultimate remedy and where litigation costs are particularly
prohibitive (especially in the absence of legal aid) the pattern would
be diﬀerent?
73 See ‘‘An equal-rights decision that ﬂies in the face of some beliefs’’, Jerusalem Post of 12
December 1994 at p. 7, and the 1 December issue of the same publication at p. 2. For a
further discussion of the use of foreign law by Israel’s Supreme Court see Z. Segal, ‘‘The
Israeli Constitutional Revolution: The Canadian Impact in the Midst of a Formative Period’’,
(1997) 8:3 Forum Constitutionnel, and A. Dodek, ‘‘The Charter . . . in the Holy Land?’’,
(1996) 8:1 Forum Constitutionnel.
74 ‘‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’’ (1974) 37 M.L.R. 1, 15.
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The same could be said about the transformation—in the course
of the last twenty years or so—of the so called Bolam75 test.
Whether one likes it or not, and whether one genuinely fears that
the adoption of a more pro-plaintiﬀ test would increase recourse to
courts, is debatable. What is not debatable are two things. First
that in a culture of rights and entitlements such as the one we now
live in, this old bastion of ‘‘doctor knows best’’ philosophy has
been subjected, albeit in the typical Common law way, to an
incremental erosion. But also not debatable is the fear that the
liberalisation of the test would, indeed, lead to more claims being
brought under this heading. Again, the German experience does not
support this fear and neither, I believe, does the American.
(e) Fifth Reﬂection
These last two examples bring me to yet another use of foreign law
by a national court namely the use of it as a means of providing
empirical evidence as to whether a particular solution works or not
in practice. Interestingly enough, this way of using foreign material
ﬁnds approval even among American writers who do not like the
idea of foreign material being used to displace American values and
solutions. Here, for instance, is how the chief proponent of this
view, Professor Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas, put it
recently when discussing Justice Scalia’s views in the context of the
death penalty and regulation of homosexual expression. He said:76
It really depends whether one is trying to place such issues
within the context of expressing basic social values about the
importance of retributive punishment . . . and condemning
‘‘unconventional’’ sexual expression. If one is behaving as a
legal anthropologist manque´, which is at least one way of
understanding the ‘‘fundamental values’’ enterprise, then the
central task is indeed trying to ﬁgure out what constitutes a
particular society’s way of expressing values in the world. It is
almost by deﬁnition, this society and not one elsewhere that is
the centre of our inquiry . . . Things [however] get far more
complicated if we view these not so much in expressive terms,
reﬂecting our basic values, but rather far more instrumentally.
Consider, for example, the proponent of capital punishment
who speaks not of revenge but, rather, its deterrent eﬀect and
concomitant saving of lives or the opponent of gays in the
military who emphasises the ostensible eﬀects on military
cohesion of accepting gays . . . into the armed forces. Given
that these latter assertions are entirely empirical in their thrust,
they call for an entirely diﬀerent response from those that are
only expressive.
75 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582.
76 ‘‘Looking Abroad When Interpreting the US Constitution; Some Reﬂections’’ (2004) 39 Texas
Int. L. J. 353, 363–4.
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Citations such as the above, and others could be given taking this
line, are not without their signiﬁcance. For they suggest that in the
United States, even those who doubt in principle the utility or
appropriateness of judicial recourse to foreign law, would not
oppose it if it helped prove how a debatable proposition actually
worked in another system. Thus, it is in this sense that, regrettably,
the House of Lords, in its recent decision in JD (FC) v. East
Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others,77 missed the
chance to test the validity of the fears that prompted the majority
to decide the case in favour of the defendant council by relying on
its favourite device: ‘‘no duty’’! Only Lord Bingham, consistent
with early opinions of his,78 dissented from this position. Rightly, in
my view, he thus laid great emphasis on the fact that the law in the
area had evolved in recent years–partly as a result of decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights, which had shown ‘‘that [the
application of an exclusionary rule] may lead to serious breaches of
Convention rights’’. And, rightly again, he also referred to French
and German law to suggest that neither of these systems had
suﬀered from allowing such claims. Once again, the open-
mindedness of this learned judge impresses as much as his wider
reading and common sense. Yet the real point relevant to this
discussion lies elsewhere.
For is this not also a perfect topic for comparative empirical
research to show whether other equally advanced systems of
equally industrialised societies have suﬀered from the rule which so
frightens the highest English court? Have other systems suﬀered by
imposing liability where English law prefers immunity? Have not
the fears of the British judges been addressed by their foreign
counterparts? And of their reasoning is not transplantable into our
system, why is that so?
The truth of the matter is that the research here needed requires
the collaboration of practitioner and academic, for only the later
can furnish the former with the information he needs to support
any comparative arguments in court. And collecting and shifting
this raw material is not easy. For if one takes Germany as an
example one sees that such claims have invariably been allowed to
be brought before a court but that few succeed in practice.79 Lest it
77 [2005] UKHL 23.
78 ‘‘If [the child/claimant] can make good her complaints (a vital condition, which I forebear
constantly to repeat), it would require very potent considerations of public policy, (. . .) to
override the rule of public policy which has ﬁrst claim on the loyalty of the law: that wrongs
should be remedied’’. M. v. Newham London Borough Council and X v. Bedfordshire County
Council [1995] 2 A.C. 633, at 663. A German case with very similar facts (BGH NJW 2005,
68) had no doubt that in this case liability would be imposed.
79 Useful raw data can be found in Bundesministerium der Justiz (ed), Zur Reform des
Staatshaftungsrechts (1976), pp. 161, 197; Infratest Burke Rechtsforschung, Zur Reform des
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be objected that even this is too much for any legal system to
digest, since it can take up much court time and eﬀort, one should
then enquire how many of these claims were actually dismissed
summarily without the excessive costs and delays of a full and
lengthy trial. And ﬁnally, one should check the level of awards—
and if one does, one will ﬁnd that these are substantially lower in
these types of cases than those one would ﬁnd in cases of medical
malpractice or traﬃc accidents. If that is, indeed, the case—and this
summary of observations is only meant to whet the appetite of the
reader as to how the research should proceed—should not the
answer then lie in the law of damages rather than be found
through the use of the blunt instrument of duty of care?
Lord Bingham touched upon these points in his judgment; and
for those interested, we provide new ideas of how the evidence
about foreign law should be marshalled, analysed, and then used.
That this needs patience, careful research, and collaborative action
is beyond doubt. But this way of providing the empirical data
could also dispel the ( justiﬁed) fears80 about the danger of
producing misleading information about foreign law. Lord Bingham
not only opened up these possibilities to inquisitive researchers and
broad-minded practitioners; he also proved again that imaginative
judges are the exception; those who prefer to hide behind opaque
concepts, the rule. If Berkshire represents another example of a
missed opportunity to reﬂect about the law more widely, it also
shows to those who believe in international dialogue how much
ground still has to be covered before such dialogue becomes
routine.
Yet the above does not mean that the foreign material can be
introduced into the court before it has been properly tested by both
Counsel and judges to make sure not only that it is accurate and
up-to-date but also that the methodology used to assemble it is
acceptable. This, in my view, is less likely to be the case when the
foreign law is introduced through Amicus briefs, prepared by
interested parties, and one thus has much sympathy with Justice
Scalia who objected to the way this evidence was presented to the
United Sates Supreme Court in the recent death penalty case of
Roper v. Simmons.81 By contrast, their Lordships’ request of
counsel in the Fairchild 82 case to address them on the solutions
given to the problem before them by continental legal systems was
Staatshaftungsrechts, Tabellarische Ergebnisse (1993–1995), Tables B 4.1, K 4, L 4.1, T 1
(though this material needs ‘‘packaging’’ before it can acquire meaningful signiﬁcance for an
English court).
80 Expressed convincingly by Justice Scalia in Roper v. Simmons 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1222 ﬀ.
81 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
82 Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 A.C. 33.
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as developed an example as one can ﬁnd so far of the use of
foreign law by an English court. Fairchild thus seem to me to
provide a good example of when and why one can look abroad for
inspiration. For, as Lord Bingham put it,83
Development of the law in this country [the UK] can not of
course depend on a head count of decisions and codes adopted
in other countries around the world, often against a
background of diﬀerent rules and traditions. The law must be
developed coherently, in accordance with principle, so as to
serve, even-handedly, the ends of justice. If however a decision
is given in this country which oﬀends one’s basic sense of
justice, and if consideration of international sources suggests
that a diﬀerent and more acceptable decision would be given in
most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this
must prompt review of the decision in question.
So the American debates about the dangers and advantages of
using foreign law as a source of ideas—and no one, let us make
this clear, has ever suggested that it can be anything more than
that—has, despite its introverted (even aggressive) tone, much to
oﬀer. Not least is its warning on how to present the foreign
material to our own courts. But if we overcome these diﬃculties,
our lawyers and our law could end up being enriched. For the
examination of diﬀerent legal systems in comparative juxtaposition
can give one the occasion to be both humble and proud.
83 Ibid., at p. 66.
C.L.J. American Courts 329
